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Abstract
A variety of rooted-tree based secure multicast networks with dierent eciencies and storage require-
ment that is linear in group size have been proposed [15, 16, 18, 19]. Recently, Canetti et al presented
a scheme [21] based on clustering that had sub-linear storage requirements at the group controller.
However, they were unable to prove or disprove that the scheme was optimal, and posed it as an open
question. In this paper we answer the question with armative NO! Additionally we use our results
from [25, 26] to show that the optimal clustering in this context is related to maximum entropy of
member revocation event, and corresponding optimal strategy is to partition members such that each
cluster has the same probability of being revoked.
Key Words: Multicast Key Distribution, Internet, Member Deletion/Revocation, Entropy, Dynamic
Groups.
1 Introduction
Providing secure multicast for large, distributed, dynamic groups is becoming an important issue in the
Internet commerce and Military communications. Network related problems such as intelligent routing,
content replication, caching, and security are primary areas of interest for service providers with large user
base. Among the secure communication models such as one-to-many, many-to-many, vast majority of the
commercial sector applications tend to be one-to-many models with a single service provider having large
number of end users subscribing to a particular service.
Many of the distributed applications like Internet newscast, stock quote updates, and distributed confer-
encing registration may benet from secure group communications. Providing an eective key management
scheme for these applications is complicated by the nature of a group that is netgraphically distributed and
exhibits varying degrees of trust, i.e. dierent parts of the group may have dierent security strengths that
can be assumed in key management. Issues such as the nature of the security parameters, inter-domain
and intra-domain interoperability, and authentication across domains need to be addressed in providing a
secure multicast key management.
Although the commercial environment may be able to tolerate the compromise or failure of end users up
to a threshold number with reasonable nancial risk, such is often not the case for military networks.
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In the context of military tactical networks, the secure communication \information ow" model is often
hierarchical. Moreover, the end users are platoons or clusters consisting of members with the following
stringent requirements on the key management:
1. Ability to remove a single member from the secure multicast group with minimal additional messages.
2. Ability to communicate with every member, even if the rest of the cluster members have failed.
3. Ability to merge or split two or more clusters.
4. Ability provide fast authentication.
In order to explain the complexities involved in secure multicast compared to secure unicast, we rst
present the secure communication model under consideration. Many recent papers provide detailed review
of this model and requirements [18, 22, 13, 26, 5, 6, 15, 16]. Among these, the review in [18] is timely,
exceptionally well written, and is updated very frequently. We present the basic model that can be found
in [18, 25, 26]. In particular, we follow the description in [18, 21, 25] due to the close nature of the problem
described in this paper.
1.1 Description of the Communication Model
A centralized Group Controller (GC) is assumed to be responsible for distributing all the required cryp-
tographic keys to the group members. In general, members can use their public keys to communicate
with GC. However, if the communication is such that the GC has to send identical message to very large
membership, it is convenient for storage, and ecient in terms of encryption, to let members share a
common data or trac encryption key called Session Key (SK). If the SK needs to be updated over a
period of time for a variety of reasons including key lifetime expiration, compromise of the key, and/or
temporary failure of one of the members, there has to be a mechanism to securely update the SK of all
valid members. Although the use of public keys is one approach to achieve this goal, a specic key called
the Key Encrypting Key (KEK) can be distributed to the members to reduce the encryptions done by GC.
Instead of using a single KEK, each member is given a set of KEKs that are shared with dierent members
for broadcast eciency. Clearly, minimization of the number of keys to be stored by the GC becomes an
issue for very large networks.
One of the main focus of the current research has been to nd ecient key distribution schemes under worst
case scenario (single member revocation) with storage minimization without introducing vulnerabilities
such as user collusion. In passing we note that some of the seemingly ecient schemes [22, 20] have serious
security weakness.
In a group communication model, removal or addition of one or more members does not necessarily
terminate the session. Since there is more than one member involved in the communications, the group
size may vary during the session due to a variety of reasons. These changes in turn prompt the SK update
to prevent unauthorized access to group communications. The SK may have to be updated due to any of
the following reasons:
 Expiration of the lifetime of the session key.
 Join/Admission of a member.
 Deletion/Revocation of a member.
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 Voluntary leave of a group member.
We now illustrate the issues in key distribution by considering two extreme cases.
1.2 Two Extreme Cases of Key Distribution
The secure group communication requires KEKs to securely distribute the updated SK. If every member
has an individual public key, for a group consisting of N members, the SK update will involve O(N)
encryption by the GC. The linear increase of the required number of encryptions in group size is not
suitable for very large scale applications common in the Internet, due to the amount of computational
burden on the GC.
A simple way to reduce the number of encryption by the GC at the time of SK update is to provide a
common KEK to all the members of the group as suggested in [13]. If the SK is to be updated due to
its lifetime expiration, the GC can perform a single encryption and update all the group members. If the
SK is to be updated due to a new member admission, before admitting the new member, GC may choose
a new SK and the future KEK, encrypt both using the current KEK and update all the members. The
newly admitted member is given the new SK and the KEK separately. However, this approach fails to
support the secure communication if a single member is to be deleted/revoked. Since the whole group,
including the deleted/revoked one share a single KEK, a revoked member will have access to all future key
updates. Hence, this approach doesn't provide an ecient recovery mechanism for the valid members in
the presence of a single member failure.
On the other spectrum, the set of keys are partitioned into two groups with respect to each member.
One of these sets is called the complement set and contains keys that are not distributed to a particular
member. If each member has a unique complementary set, this set can be used for key updates in the event
the corresponding member is revoked. The GC associates a KEK and a member in a one-to-one manner.
If there are N members in the group, there will be N KEKs each representing a single member. The
GC then distributes these N KEKs such that a member is given all the KEKs except the one associated
with him/her. Hence, the complementary set contains a single KEK for each member. If the GC wants
to delete/revoke a member, it needs to broadcast only the member index to the rest of the group. Since
all members except the revoked one has the associated KEK of the revoked member, they can use that
KEK for SK updates. This approach requires only one encryption at the GC and allows the GC to update
the SK under single member compromise. In fact this approach seem to allow even multiple member
deletion/revocation. Considering the complementary sets of any two members reveals that all the KEKs of
the group are covered by the KEKs held by any two members. Hence, any two deleted/revoked members
can collaborate and have access to all future conversations. Thus, under user collusion, this key scheme
does not scale beyond two members. Thus the scheme doesn't have perfect forward secrecy under collusion
of revoked members. This approach requires KEK storage that scales as O(N).
The above mentioned schemes are two extremes of KEK distribution. Depending on the degree of user
clustering, a large variety of key management schemes with dierent amounts of KEKs per member can be
generated. Currently available solutions for key management can be grouped into two classes based on the
available results. The rst class is called the non-tree types, and the second one is called the rooted-tree
type. Among these, rooted-tree based schemes have become popular due to their communication-storage
eciency with no functional relationship requirements among the keys. These schemes were the focus of
the work reported in [21] where the open problem addressed in this paper was posed.
The paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 presents the review of non-tree schemes. Section 3
3
presents the review of basic concepts behind the rooted-trees based key distribution. Section 4 presents
the work reported in [21] and the open problem posed. Section 5 presents some necessary preliminaries
that can also be found in [25]. Section 6 addresses the optimal clustering of a given secure multicast group.
Section 7 presents the analysis of the storage-communication minimization problem in the context of the
clustering presented in [21] and shows that the storage requirements at GC can be computed explicitly.
We then show that the results of this calculation reveal that the issue of optimality does not arise due to
the nature of this function. We also prove this point by considering a simple ordinary dierential equation
that there is no such minima. We however show that there is a minimal point which corresponds to the
case of minimal storage scheme, and there can be a host of parameter selections that will yield results
better than the sub-linear storage O( N
logN
) given in [21].
2 Review of the Non-Tree Based Key Distribution Schemes
Non-tree based approaches are listed in [5]-[9]. Among these [5] uses group Die Hellman technique
for generating the keys. This scheme makes use of the diculty of performing the discrete logarithm in
generating the keys. The computations increase linearly with the group size.
In [6], an approach with computations independent of the group size was proposed. However this scheme
has problem due to member collusion.
In [14], a cluster based approach was proposed. In this scheme, each cluster has its own session keys
and KEKs. This method with suitable modications has been incorporated into some of the tree based
schemes [22, 21].
Schemes based on the assumption of information theoretic security have been recently presented in [7, 8, 9].
Notion of key capacities and information rates also was used by Maurer [10] in secret key agreement
problem by two members. Additional results along the lines of information rates were studied by Csiszar
et al [11, 12].
3 Review of the Rooted Tree Based Key Distribution Schemes
For clarity, we present the original rooted-tree scheme proposed by [15]. Hierarchical rooted-tree based keys
have been used for dierent applications. The rst attempt at using a rooted-tree based key distribution
approach for ecient member revocation was independently proposed in [15] and [16]. Modications to
reduce the computational and storage requirements of these two methods were later presented in [18, 19,
22, 20]. The most elegant key distribution approach on the rooted-trees with rigorous proofs on security
provided to date is given in [18]. We will briey review the needed basic concepts behind the rooted-tree
based key distribution in this section.
3.1 Distribution of Keys on the Tree
As a concrete illustration, Figure 1 presents a KEK distribution based on a binary rooted tree for 8
members. In this approach, each leaf of the tree represents a unique member of the group; i.e. the leaves
are in a one-to-one correspondence with members. Each node of the tree represents a key. The set of keys
along the path from the root to a particular leaf node are assigned to the member represented by that leaf
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Figure 1: The Logical Key Tree of [18, 15, 16, 20, 22]
If there is no member deletion/revocation or compromise, the common KEK denoted by KO can be
used to update the SK for all the members. The tree based structure also induces a natural hierarchical
grouping among the members. By logically placing the members appropriately, the GC can choose the
appropriate keys and hence selectively update, if needed, the keys of the group. For example, in Figure 1,
members M5;M6;M7, and M8 exclusively share the key K2:2. The GC can use the key K2:2 to selectively
communicate with members M5;M6;M7, and M8. Hence, the local grouping of the members and the keys
shared on the tree may be decided by the GC based on application specic needs. In order to be able to
selectively disseminate information to a subset of group members, the GC has to ensure that the common
key assigned to a subset is not assigned to any member not belonging to that subset. Using the notation
fmgK to denote the encryption of m with key K, and the notation A  ! B : fmgK to denote the secure
exchange of message m from A to B, GC can selectively send a message m to members ve through eight
by the following transmission:
GC  !M5;M6;M7;M8 : fmgK2:2
If, however the key K2:2 is invalidated for any reason, GC needs to update the key K2:2 before being able
to use a common key for members M5;M6;M7, and M8. It can do so by rst generating a new version
of K2:2, and then performing two encryptions, one with K1:3 and the other with K1:4. The following two
messages are needed to update key K2:2 to the relevant members of the group.
GC  !M5;M6 : fK2:2gK1:3
GC  !M7;M8 : fK2:2gK1:4
3.2 Member Revocation in Rooted Trees
From now on, we will use the term keys to denote SK or KEKs unless there is a need for clarication.
Since the SK and the root KEK are common to all the members in the multicast group, they have to be
invalidated each time a member is revoked. Apart from these two keys, all the intermediate KEKs of the
revoked member need to be invalidated. In the event there is bulk member revocation, the GC has to
 Identify all the invalid keys,
 Find the minimal number of valid keys that need to be used to transmit the updated keys.
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For an arbitrary tree that may not hold members in all the leaves these two problems need to be solved
by exhaustive search. The general principle behind the member revocation is discussed below.
MemberM1 in Figure 1 is indexed by the set of four keys fKO;K2:1;K1:1;K0:1g. RevokingM1 is equivalent
to invalidating these four keys, generating four new keys, and updating these keys of the appropriate valid
members. When M1 is revoked, the following key updates need to be performed: (a) all member need new
KO, (b) members M2  M4 need to update fK2:1g, (c) members M3  M4 need to update fK1:2g, and (d)
member M2 needs to update fK1:1g.
The following observations can be made towards the rooted tree based key distributions.
 Since each member is assigned (2 + logdN) = logdNd
2 keys, deletion of a single member requires
(2 + logdN) keys to be invalidated.
 Since there are (1 + logdN) nodes between the root and a leaf and logdN nodes are shared with
other members, and for each common node one encryption is required, the GC needs to perform a
total of logdN encryptions.
 For a d  ary tree with depth h = logdN , the GC has to store 1 + 1 + d+ d
2 +    + dh = d(N+1) 2(d 1)
number of keys. Setting d = 2 leads to the binary tree for which the required amount of storage
works out to be 2(N+1) 22 1 = 2N . This result can be independently checked by noting that a binary
tree with N leaves has 2N  1 nodes. Hence the GC has to store the SK and (2N  1) KEKs, leading
to 2N keys that need to be stored.
The above given storage number doesn't make any assumption about the type of key generation. Sev-
eral modications to the original scheme have been proposed recently. In [21], an approach for storage-
communication minimization was proposed. We summarize the approach and the results of [21].
4 Summary of Results in [21] and the Open Problem
Results in [21] were derived using a hybrid technique. For continuation of the session under member
revocation, (a) all the users should have the SK, (b) each user i should share a unique member specic key
ki with the GC, (c) each user may have one or more KEKs it shares with dierent set of members.
4.1 Reduction of Storage Requirement Using Pseudo-random Functions
Canetti et al noted [21] that the GC can minimize the key storage requirements by generating the member
specic keys as outputs of a pseudo-random function with indexing. In this scheme [21], the GC holds a
single secret key r, an index to a pseudo-random function fr [21]. The keys are generated for a member i
by ki = fr(i). When a user is compromised, the GC computes SK, encrypts the new SK with the individual
keys of each valid member and distributes. Security of this key generation scheme is based on the security
of the pseudo-random function and the encryption scheme used.
4.2 Hybrid Approach
For the KEKs shared by two or more members, we can verify [21] that an attempt to use the technique of
pseudo-random function based key generation on the rooted-tree with a single secret key will require the
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entire tree to be updated and thus increase the encryption requirements from being O(logN) to O(N).
Hence, a mix model of key distribution was proposed in [21] to minimize the key storage requirements at
GC. The model can be summarized in the following steps: Given a group of size N ,
1. form clusters with xed size M .
2. build a a  ary rooted-tree with depth




3. assign each cluster to a unique leaf node of the a  ary rooted-tree of depth, denoted by b.
4. form a M   ary tree of one unit deep inside each cluster.
The last interpretation is ours and is not explicit in [21]. Once the a   ary rooted-tree of depth b is
constructed, the key distribution is done using the technique in [15]. For the M   ary tree with one unit
depth, the key distribution is done using pseudo-random function technique described below [21].
4.2.1 Communication-Storage Parameters
Using the minimal storage scheme in conjunction with the rooted-tree, the user storage, GC storage, and
the number of encryptions needed were presented in [21] in a tabular format. We reproduce the results
below.












Encryptions (M   1) + (a  1) loga(
N
M
) O(logn) 2n0:5   2
Table 1. Parameters of the tradeo scheme in [21].
Setting a = 2, M = 1 leads to results in [15]. In example 1, a = 2, m = O(log n),
in example 2, a = m = n0:5
4.2.2 Discussion
In [21], authors posed a question whether the sub-linear storage requirement at the center for example 1
was the optimal solution. They left it as an open question. We note that the answer to their question is
armative NO!.
We also note that if the group membership is not homogeneous in terms of degree of security, there is an
analytical proof that the storage requirements on the rooted tree can be further reduced and hence the
theoretical model presented for clustering in [21] can be improved upon by studying the basic concepts
from information theory. We used these ideas to solve the optimal number of keys per member, and
computationally aordable key length in [25, 26]. In this paper we use entropy in yet another useful
manner in clustering. Although the idea of using information theory is same, the applications and the
results in this paper are completely dierent from those in [25, 26]. We rst review the basic ideas that
are useful [25, 26] for probabilistic modeling in the next section.
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5 Probabilistic Modeling of Member Revocation
Since the key updates are performed in response to member revocation, statistics of member revocation
event, is appropriate for system design and performance characterization. We denote pi as the probability
of revocation of member i.
5.1 Dening the Shannon Entropy of Member Revocation Event
In physical processes that involve probabilistic modeling, one can often dene the uncertainty of the
occurance of an event using a suitably dened entropy of the process. We will use Shannon entropy [1] to
express the amount of uncertainty as to which member will be revoked. We rst state the denition of the
Shannon entropy in the context of member revocation event.




pi logd pi (2)
where pi is the probability of revocation of member i. As mentioned earlier, the entropy expresses the
uncertainty as to which member will be revoked in d  ary digits.
We note the following important points:
1. A word of caution is in place since the Shannon entropy is often used to describe the rates in the
source coding literature. We use it in the context of its physical interpretation which is the amount
of uncertainty about the occurance of an event.
2. We also note that the denition of the entropy of member revocation event did not require the knowl-
edge about the keys or key distributions. The basic process is independent of the key distribution.
The member revocation probability can be related to the keys i we can map the individual members
to another event in a unique manner.
3. Mapping of the individual members to unique leafs of the tree for example forms a one-to-one map.
Then, revoking a member can be interpreted as revoking the leaf node of the tree. Hence the
probabilities of member revocation can be interpreted as probabilities of leaf node (or leaf node key)
revocation. Massey discusses the separation and the mapping of a physical process to an algorithm
in detail in [3].
4. Since the member revocation event and the leaf node key revocation event are probabilistically
identical, entropy of the member revocation event is same as the entropy of the leaf key revocation
event. This important observation is summarized as a theorem below.
Theorem 2. Leaf Key Revocation Entropy is the entropy or uncertainty as to which of the leaf key will
be revoked. Since the leaf key revocation probability is in one-to-one correspondence with the member
revocation probabilities, Leaf Key Revocation entropy is identical to the entropy of the member revocation
event.
We now show, without proofs that if members of the group have dierent probabilities of revocation, the
strategy of forming clusters with equal number of members should be replaced by the strategy of forming
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clusters of equal probability to obtain a rooted-tree that is full and has all the leafs at the same depth.
Otherwise the strategy is to build a tree such that a cluster having probability of revocation p̂i be at depth
loga p̂i from the root [25, 26].
6 Cluster Size Selection
Since the set of KEKs assigned to a cluster should be unique, and the KEKs are distributed on the nodes
of the tree, the unique indexing requires that the number of keys assigned to a cluster should satisfy the
Kraft inequality [25, 26]. Denoting the number of keys assigned to a cluster with probability of revocation
pi by li, we note
NX
j=1
a li  1: (3)
Minimization of the average number of keys held by a member with the unique indexing leads to the
solution that the optimal number of keys assigned to a cluster with revocation probability p̂i is given by
li =   loga p̂i. The following theorem summarizes the result in [21].
Theorem 1. For a rooted-tree based key assignment that satisfy Kraft inequality, optimal average num-
ber of keys, excluding the root key and the SK, held by a member is given by the a   ary entropy
Ha =  
PN
i=1 p̂i logd p̂i of the member revocation event. For a member i with probability of revocation p̂i,
satisfying the optimization criteria, the optimal number of keys li, excluding the root key and the SK, is
given by
li =   logd p̂i: (4)
From the formula, we note that the depth of all the leafs from the root are equal i li = constant;8i.
Hence, the probabilities of revocation should be equal for all the members to form clusters of equal size.
Under this case, the entropy of member revocation scheme attains its maximum value of logaN .
Hence, we have shown that the cluster selection in [21] corresponds to a special type of network which has
equal probability of member revocation.
7 Answer to the Open Question
The simplest approach in answering the question posed in [21] is to count the number of keys to be stored
at the center. The key distribution structure in [21] has an a   ary rooted-tree with depth b followed by












Setting a = 2, M = 1 leads to the familiar result in [15] for binary rooted-tree in case that has (2n -1) keys
excluding the SK.
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Results of sub-linear case was derived in [21] by setting M = logN . To check if this is an optimum point



















a 1 is a hyperbola in M for a xed value
of a and N . For a hyperbola, the minimal point is the value of the hyperbola at the highest value of the
domain of the function. In this specic case, this point is M = N and this forces a = N . In fact any point






We present numerical examples in a tabular manner for a binary tree (a = 2). For this case the storage
function reduces to N M
M
.
N logN Range for improved results
210 10 N M > 10
215 15 N M > 15
220 20 N M > 20









This leads to the solution that N = g(M) = M . This solution of course is the minimal point discussed
earlier.
8 Conclusion
Providing a key management scheme for distributed large scale networks is a dicult problem. Although
many elegant schemes have been proposed, an appropriate solution which can handle group dynamics and
still be \light weight" seem to pose a major challenge. In commercial applications it may be appropriate
to tolerate a degree of session key loss. This may be a better solution than trying to re-key each time
a member is compromised. However, the military networks don't have that exibility. If the military
network tends towards wireless and low power devices, that are distributed in a next generation battle
eld, the aordable computational power becomes an issue. At the same time, for a military network,
re-keying under every single member removal/compromise is mandatory. Hence, the problem of re-keying
under worst case is a very relevant and one of the most dicult problem.
We have not shown the utilization analysis due to page limit. Depending on the allowed nal pages of the
journal paper, we will provide the results of utilization analysis, and the removal of logic circuit evaluation
as the method of grouping the valid members.
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